Indigenous Futures: defuturing and futuring – an analytical framework for policy development?

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There appears to be consensus – by omission – that the concept of indigenous futures should be accepted at face value. So I scavenged the internet to see if I could locate an academic descriptor or a framework around how we think about it as a concept, and whether it could help in the design of policy fit for the future.

Initially, I was locked into temporality – viewing future in opposition to past. A useful approach emerged in an article by Schultz (2018) that creates a distinction between futuring and defuturing (p.80). The former referring to extending human existence and the latter destroying it (Schultz, 2018 p.80).  That approach helped to reframe how I had been thinking about the concept of futures. Here I was able to draw a connection to Gordon’s (2013) discussion of temporality on indigenous identity, contemplating indigenous futures analogously to western arguments about indigenous authenticity. Specifically, the way in which identity is often confined to the past by virtue of its authenticity being determined in modernity.

Perhaps, Gordon’s (2013) criticism of modernity imposing conceptions of authenticity on Indigenous Peoples could then be viewed as indigenous defuturing, whereas his argument that Indigenous Peoples are “connected to ancestral forms of knowledge and cultural formation but are also the transformation of those norms in the human activity of cultural formation” could be viewed as indigenous futuring. Arguably, indigenous futures then is not about when in time but how in time.

To explain further, in a policy context, indigenous futures could refer to how policies extend the survival of Indigenous Peoples in contrast, to indigenous defuturing where policies – intentionally or not –  promote the ongoing colonisation of indigenous knowledges, geographies and cultures, in effect threatening their survival. Such examples could include regeneration of tribal economies as an indigenous futuring compared with deforestation as an indigenous defuturing.

In a practical sense,I was able to apply this thinking at the inaugural Auckland Trade and Economic Policy School event concerned with the future of trade. A key insight was the emphasis on the increasing servicification of trade combined with advancing technology, the digitisation of data and the impact that this new wave of globalisation will have on future generations. However, absent in the discussion overall, was the demographic shift that will occur in Aotearoa over the next 50 years as the Māori population grows while the birth rates of Pākehā decline. In my view, the forecasts of most speakers fell into the trap of what Cicero refers to as the “tyranny of the present” as discussed in Wade’s (2012) scenario planning field guide based on the assumption that “the future will be a variation on a theme, and that theme is today” (p.9).

Two themes I was particularly interested to draw connections between were firstly, the idea of future factories being “people” in a services economy and secondly, the concept of reshoring, which refers to revitalising local manufacturing and bringing back other types of jobs to a country (where in the past it made sense for them to be offshored).

From an indigenous futuring perspective, there is a risk that silence on the demographic shift will lead to the development of ineffective trade and domestic policy to address the needs of the future Māori workforce. Moreover, when Māori futures are generally discussed, it is usually restricted to the risk of automation of their jobs because Māori disproportionately fill low waged labour roles, that robots will be able to do in future.

Despite recognition of services as the future of global economies, there was no contemplation of the role of Māori as a growing proportion of the national workforce, in advancing New Zealand’s trade in services value proposition. More importantly, there was a missed opportunity to explore the equality dividend that could arise with a demographic shift in lifting wellbeing outcomes for Māori as leaders in the new economy. Effectively, Māori futures are still conceived in deficit terms, despite the significant role Māori will play (and already play) in trade in services in the future.

The other aspect is in the context of reshoring. A current trend domestically is to create jobs in, or shift jobs to the regions. While some manufacturers are taking their factories to the regions, this kind of job creation is short term. The types of roles in these factories are the very kind that will likely be automated in future, creating rust buckets in our regions. Whereas in the past Māori were subjects of urban drift, there is a huge risk that Māori will be tempted to the regions for short term employment relief and forced out of cities where innovation in services will mostly take place, perpetuating the colonisation of Māori well into the future. This regionalisation is potentially a defuturing policy for Māori and should be approached with caution. While technology is making regional relocation and remote working a greater possibility, our policy settings will need to be careful not to commit Māori to low skilled regional jobs, while upskilling white folk in the cities for the future of services in the regions.

Indicatively then, trade policy has potential to play both a futuring and defuturing role for Māori.  Developing an analytical framework to help policy makers understand the impact of trade policy and measures on Māori futures and the risk of defuturing will be critical for indigenous futures in New Zealand.

[Note: This post is adapted from a reflection written for other purposes on 9 September 2019]

References

Gordon, L.R. (2013). On the temporality of indigenous identity. UTSePress: Australia.

Schultz, T. (2018). Mapping Indigenous Futures: Decolonising Techno-Colonising Designs. Strategic Design Research Journal, 11(2): 79-91. doi: 10.4013/sdrj.2018.112.04

Wade, W. (2012) Scenario Planning: A Field Guide to the Future. John Wiley & Sons Incorporated. –

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Post Series: Should Indigenous economies take the LEAP? (3)

WIBF photo
Conference Dinner, World Indigenous Business Forum 2018, Rotorua

In the previous two posts, I laid out the context and set the theoretical framework to answer a question: whether indigenous economies should take the LEAP.

This final part outlines ways to conceive of practicing mana motuhake within the existing legal system by carving out special jurisdictions that enable Indigenous Peoples to enter trading relationships and pursue their economic aspirations on their own terms.

These posts serve only as introductions to ideas about practical approaches to realising Indigenous self-determination.

The link to theory

With increased cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, Indigenous Peoples have become visible to each other again in economic and trade contexts. Events like the World Indigenous Business Forum or the World Indigenous Tourism Summit indicate that tribal leaders and indigenous entrepreneurs are looking for ways to leverage those opportunities and reinvigorate the entrepreneurial spirit and pragmatism of their ancestors for future generations. Countries around the world are exploring and evolving policies as an innovative approach to accelerate economic development in areas of high deprivation or underdevelopment – unfortunately a space that Indigenous Peoples know too well as a direct result of the violence of colonisation. There have been mixed successes and many lessons, one of the more well known examples being Shenzhen, China.

The essence of these posts is to suggest that there is an opportunity for New Zealand to support Māori to introduce everyday acts of resurgence into the international trade context to open up new spaces for cultural resurgence which could create and set new trade and economic expectations driven by Indigenous Peoples and their relationships to planet, place and people.

Exploring development models

In exploring development models, international models provide a useful and persuasive starting point. Intensive research from the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (Harvard Project) founded by Professors Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt confirms that Indigenous Peoples achieve better outcomes when enabled to make decisions about their own economic development (Harvard Project, n.d.). In its 20 years of operation, the Harvard Project has established four key themes that matter to the success of indigenous development models: sovereignty, institutions, culture and leadership (Harvard Project, n.d.). Comparably, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which by general definition refer to geographic locations within a national territory where the normal domestic rules do not all apply (Bell, 2016, pp.959-960) offer various exemptions and incentives to conduct business through free trade, foreign trade, export processing, and enterprise zones depending on the specific needs of the community (Crampton & Acharya, 2015, p.6).

SEZs and LEAPs as regional development policy initiatives provide alternatives for policy makers to “experiment with different regulations without threatening established national power structures” and to “trial and promote reforms that other regions could replicate or borrow from to meet the needs their particular constituency” ensuring that governments are responsive and relevant to their communities (Crampton & Acharya, 2010, p.6). Adopting this regional lens has benefits because New Zealand’s economic policy agencies already work in regionally defined programmes and this focus can assist in prioritising a range of development zone areas. These strategic and political levers matter because at a practical level policy solutions require political will.

SEZs are often adopted to encourage investment and stimulate growth in underdeveloped areas (Bell, 2010; Crampton & Acharya, 2015). However, some of the challenges SEZs confront include mixed success resulting from low institutional quality, poor local infrastructure, or corruption (Crampton & Acharya, 2015, p.6). The more radical LEAP zones (LEAPs) “special legal, economic, administrative, and political jurisdictions” are smaller in size than SEZs but draw people to them voluntarily as opposed to imposing them on existing communities (Klugmann, 2013). LEAPs share similar themes to the Harvard Project findings including their inherently regional focus, freedom to regulate according to the needs of the community, and an emphasis on leadership and credible institutions (Bell, 2016; Wong & Buba, 2017; Crampton & Acharya, 2015). Whereas SEZs focus on market liberalisation and financial incentives to do business in the designated zones (Crampton & Acharya, 2015; Bell, 2016; Wong & Buba, 2017), LEAPs offer more flexibility to advance the broader set of Māori aspirations. However, improving the usefulness of these models for the Māori context will require some deviation from the standard SEZ or LEAP definition: shifting the driver from economic growth to collective capability for self-determination.

Murphy (2014) describes the collective capability for self-determination as “members of a distinct political community” cooperating to implement a shared vision and build the physical, cultural, legal and political infrastructure to “shape their individual and collective futures” (pp.323-324). He also considers “capability for collective self-determination partly constitutive of the freedom and well-being of communities and their individual members” (Murphy, 2014, p.326). In linking Murphy’s approach to both Corntassel and Puig, collective capability could be produced through a combination of indigenous self-determination principles and approaches that policy makers could apply to development models such as LEAPs to accelerate indigenous economic development underpinned by a both responsibility to the natural world (Corntassel, 2012) and achieving community oranga (wellbeing) (Murphy, 2014). Re-framing in this way, centres communities and their wellbeing in trade discussions as opposed to market liberalisation which is often met with fierce opposition by indigenous communities due to the negative impacts globalisation inflicts on Indigenous Peoples and the protection of their natural resources (Puig, 2019). It also aligns with the Harvard Project findings that:

“When Native nations make their own decisions about what development approaches to take, they consistently outperform external decision makers on matters as diverse as governmental form, natural resource management, economic development, health care and social service provision” (Harvard Project)

There is a risk that devolving or ascribing LEAP functions for a geographical area outside of government controls could create domestic tensions as some of the public may express concerns about political stability if alternative legal or rules structures operate within the nation structure. However, this already happens to an extent with Local Government and as discussed throughout previously, marae already demonstrate how tikanga and kawa can operate inside a national legal structure without the threat of instability. As human beings, we have shown that we can operate according to a range of rules within a meta structure without things falling apart. LEAPs are not about implementing lawless regions, they are about enabling particular rules to be decided according to the needs of the particular community independent of the national body of rules.

Framing matters. Articulating the value proposition of LEAPs as exploring new ways to give effect to indigenous self-determination in a way that complements the national legal narrative will be imperative. Explaining the models innovation potential that combines the very best models available as the starting point, not the aspiration could shift opponents from a fear of instability to an optimism of possibility (Klugmann, 2013). For instance, rather than settling trade or investment disputes in courtrooms or through arbitration tribunals, they could be settled in the marae – kanohi ki te kanohi – direct between the parties, thereby reshaping and humanising commercial matters that in contemporary times have become highly impersonal transactions.

Imagining a Māori SEZ or LEAP in New Zealand 

In terms of modelling, Bell (2016) notes that “[z]ones have in recent years begun shifting away from encouraging international trade with relatively simple financial incentives-exemptions from customs obligations, toward ‘multiuse developments’” comprising industries, commercial, retail, residential and tourism (p.974). The multiuse proposition could be particularly useful for developing remote or rural areas, or those smaller towns with high levels of poverty due to low employment – in both urban and rural settings. While not enjoying the special economic status of an SEZ or LEAP, Ruakura, the inland port and logistics hub owned by Tainui Group Holdings (TGH) reflects a multiuse type arrangement with the associated benefits (Ruakura, n.d.) and provides a potentially useful starting point to imagining an SEZ or LEAP in New Zealand in an indigenous commercial context.

Ruakura is located within the Golden Triangle[1] with rail and road connections to both Tāmaki Makaurau (Auckland) and Tauranga ports (Ruakura, n.d.). When fully operational, it will offer a logistics and freight hub, residential areas, innovation centres and retail, providing jobs and homes for more than 10,000 employees and around 4,500 residents at Ruakura (Ruakura, n.d.). Given the stage of development for Ruakura, there is an opportunity for TGH and the government to explore these kinds of innovative approaches to accelerate the operationalisation of the hub. Comparing indigenous initiatives with different zone statuses and at varying levels of zone potential could enable TGH and the government to gain deeper insight into the innovation potential for indigenous economies, and their future trade and international relationships.

Iron Horse Industrial Park a Foreign Trade Zone in the U.S. owned by the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (Iron Horse, n.d.), offers a useful comparative case for TGH and the government to consider how it could support Waikato Tainui to exercise its mana motuhake (self-determination) through acquiring LEAP status for its development (if it desired that status).  Iron Horse received Foreign Trade Zone status in 2014 to enable more liberalised international business transactions and to provide benefits such as tax incentives and duty exemptions, reductions and deferrals for businesses and investors seeking to enter the U.S. market (Iron Horse, n.d.). Like Ruakura, it is strategically located, and is considered a magnet site of the Port of Greater Oklahoma City’s FTZ (Iron Horse, n.d.). If TGH could attract the investment it needs to supercharge its Ruakura industrial development, the benefits of that investment – building the collective capability for self-determination of its people – could potentially accrue to its tribal members much sooner than its current timeframe of 2041.

Given the shape of our societies, the importance of both advancing iwi developments and exploring similar opportunities for urbanised Māori, is critical for policy makers to also explore to unlock the full potential of the diverse economies within Te Ao Māori.  Two examples for conceptualising innovative approaches for advancing urban indigenous economies is the city of Toronto’s Indigenous Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (ICIE) that is currently under development (City of Toronto, n.d.) and He Waka Eke Noa, a social procurement intermediary based in Manukau, Auckland.

Note: conceptualising LEAPs in urban environments creates a range of challenges – including challenges around tribal interests in land where it might be proposed that a LEAP is established. One way around this significant challenge could include corrective contemporary Te Tiriti settlements but this is a topic of its own and would require careful, inclusive and transparent consideration.

Indigenous Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (ICIE)

When complete, the ICIE will offer a range of economic supports to Indigenous Peoples such as business incubators and accelerator programmes for entrepreneurs to scale up their businesses (City of Toronto, n.d.). It will also provide a commercial space for indigenous economic connections that will operate as a hub in what is to become an indigenous business district in downtown Toronto (City of Toronto, n.d.). The notion of an indigenous business district enables the City of Toronto to expand its vision and to outsource its development to the Indigenous Peoples it will serve. These kinds of initiatives support notions of resurgence as expressed by Corntassel (2012), and provide the infrastructure to build collective capability as imagined by Murphy (2010) and the rules and procedures of how any international trade could be managed from within zone (Puig, 2019), but all of those components require the open minds of decision makers and the institutional support to back them.

He Waka Eke Noa

New Zealand could look to the ICIE model to explore the potential to evolve He Waka Eke Noa from a virtual hub to a physical hub similar to the ICIE with the broader aspiration of establishing an indigenous business district with LEAP status in Manukau.

He Waka Eke Noa currently operates as an intermediary function that “connects Māori and Pasifika-owned businesses with clients and buyers wanting to purchase goods, services and works” (He Waka Eke Noa, n.d.). This initiative is the result of a collaboration between local and central government agencies in Tāmaki Makaurau (Auckland) indicating that the model – as an innovation – enjoys a sufficient level of institutional support to improve its chances of success. The value proposition of a He Waka Eke Noa as the centre of an indigenous business district, is its current location in South Auckland – an area with one of the highest concentrations of Māori in the rohe and therefore the ability for Māori in the area to benefit directly from local jobs and local spend in the community.  In addition, its upgraded public transport infrastructure and proximity to the Auckland International Airport also presents global opportunities at its doorstep, with ease of access to a major trade and logistics hub and the ability to attract local spend from increasing traveller flows to the region to help sustain jobs and enterprise in the area.

Other levers and their linkages to LEAPs

When thinking about LEAPs in the indigenous context, ‘reservations’ also come to mind. While marae reservations in New Zealand are not an ideal comparative to North American reservations, understanding the Canadian and U.S. reservation models provides a way of understanding how to better utilise the marae reservation status. North American reservations arise from negotiated settlements with their settler governments, where a “portion of their traditional territory is reserved for permanent use by the tribe” (Sierra Project, 2015, p.3). Along with the reservation of land, the Tribe is accorded a degree of sovereignty to enact laws and govern people within its territories (Sierra Project, 2015, p.3). This limited sovereignty effectively prevents States from regulating the commercial activities of Native Americans on their reservations (Sierra Project, 2015, p.3). Arguably, reservations reflect LEAPs based on the domains that tribes do have control over. However, the prohibition from entering into “treaties with foreign governments the way a traditional nation would be able to” (Sierra Project, 2015, p.3) limits the use of international trade as a tool for self-determination. LEAP status could assist in overcoming that by providing more levers than a standard FTZ that some tribes have opted for, in their tribal economic development.

In New Zealand, while marae reservations can be set aside for a range of purposes to prevent the land being compulsorily acquired under the Public Works Act 1981,[2] the key point about marae is that it could be possible for them to operate as LEAP connecting points to build a networked reservation that establishes the cultural infrastructure and backbone support for the creation of indigenous LEAPs throughout New Zealand. LEAP status could enhance the function of marae to give them greater alignment to North American reservations by imputing a relational sovereignty for networked members enabling the regeneration of Māori cultural and economic assets. Strengthening cultural identity and enterprise together could as Murphy’s (2014) approach suggests, enhance both the physical and psychological wellbeing of Māori, by addressing social and economic triggers to stress and cultural connectivity. Anecdotally, when people see themselves reflected in their communities as valued members they feel more connected to who they are and where they belong. In addition, implementing LEAPs could help grow the number and range of enterprise and employment opportunities – including roles in the tradable (export) sector, to lift Māori incomes so Māori are accessing a greater proportion of the nation’s prosperity.

A fundamental challenge to achieving special economic status is the racism that persists in New Zealand, including in its institutions.  Any special status sought or granted to its Indigenous Peoples will likely be met with rigorous resistance diminishing the will of politicians to take bold stances to advance the innovation potential of Māori economies and their cultural centres – marae. Often, opponents liken Māori cultural identity to religion and their marae to Churches or Mosques, whom, they will argue should also have access to those same special statuses. However, there is nothing in the idea of LEAPs to preclude those institutions from seeking similar special economic statuses. Additionally, critics of this school of thought should be careful not to conflate Māori identity with religion, and marae with churches, as doing so erases an entire peoples history which comes dangerously close to proposing cultural genocide.

New Zealand has an opportunity to partner with its indigenous communities to identify urban and rural areas that could benefit from special economic status and better understand the kinds of trade policy measures that will accelerate Māori economic development and give effect to the right of its Indigenous Peoples to self-determination to lift the wellbeing outcomes of Māori. The theories offered by Corntassel, Puig, and Murphy provide a basis for developing a uniquely indigenous development model without prescribing its rules, processes or conditions. Moreover, the tripartite of views provides the foundation to access legal frameworks that enable the establishment of zones where cultural resurgence can prosper and produce collective capability. Therefore, LEAPs offer an alternative approach that could support Māori (and other Indigenous Peoples) to continue the innovation legacy their ancestors began more than 6000 years ago when leaving Taiwan.  Should indigenous economies take the LEAP? Simply put, yes.

[1]              The Golden Triangle is ‘the term economic commentators use to describe the geographic area bound up by Auckland, Hamilton and Tauranga’ (New Zealand Herald, 2018).

[2]           Section 338, Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993

References

Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation 2013.

Bell, T. (2016).  Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial Charters, to Foreign-Trade Zones, toward USSEZs. Buffalo Law Review. 64(5), 959-1016. Retrieved from: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol64/iss5/2

Bellwood, P., Hung, H-C. & lizuka, Y. (2011) Taiwan Jade in the Philippines: 3,000 Years of Trade and Long-distance Interaction, in Purissima Benitez-Johannot (ed.), Paths of Origins: The Austronesian Heritage in the Collections of the National Museum of the Philippines,the Museum Nasional Indonesia,and the Netherlands Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Singapore: ArtPostAsia. Retrieved from: http://www.earth.sinica.edu.tw/~epma/papers/…/A14%20PathsofOrigins_pp30-41_2011.pdf

 

Bellwood, P; Fox, J.J & Tryon, D. (2006). The Austronesians in History: Common Origins and Diverse Transformations in Bellwood, P; Fox, J.J & Tryon, D. (eds.) The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. ANU Press. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbjx1.4

Charter of the United Nations 1945.

City of Toronto. (n.d.) Indigenous Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Retrieved from: https://www.toronto.ca/business-economy/business-start-ups/incubators/indigenous-centre-for-entrepreneurship/

Consedine, B. (2007). Historical Influences and the Māori Economy. Wellington: Te Puni Kōkiri.

Cornell, S. & Kalt, J.P. (2000). Where’s the glue? Institutional and cultural foundations of American Indian economic development. Journal of Socio-Economics 29, 443–470.

Corntassel, J. (2012). Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 86-101.

Crampton, E. & Acharya, K. (2015). In the Zone: Creating a Toolbox for Regional Prosperity. Wellington: NZ Initiative. Retrieved form: https://nzinitiative.org.nz/reports-and-media/reports/in-the-zone-creating-a-toolbox-for-regional-prosperity/

Crowley, T. (2006) Austronesian languages: overview.  Encyclopedia of language & linguistics. Oxford: Elsevier, 600–609.

European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (2014, May 22) WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R.

Francis v. The Queen [1956] S.C.R. 618.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947.

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He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835.

Huang, SM. and Liu, SH. (2016). Discrimination and incorporation of Taiwanese indigenous Austronesian peoples. Asian Ethnicity, 17(2), 294-312.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

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King, Michael. (2003). The Penguin History of New Zealand. Auckland. Penguin Books Ltd.

Klugmann, M. (2013, Jul 12). LEAP Zones: Faster growth with less conflict. Cayman Financial Review. Retrieved from: https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2013/07/12/leap-zones-faster-growth-with-less-conflict/

Ko, A.M., Chen, CY, Fu, Q., Delfin, F., Li, M., Chiu, HL., Stoneking, M. and Ko, YC. (2014). Early Austronesians: Into and Out Of Taiwan. The American Journal of Human Genetics. 94, 426–436.

Le Dressay, A., Lavallee, N., and Reeves, J. (2010). First Nations Trade, Specialization, and Market Institutions: A Historical Survey of First Nation Market Culture” Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International 72. Retrieved from: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/72

Mahuta, N. (2019, Apr 7). Indigenous experts advise on Declaration plan. Press Release. The Official Website of the New Zealand Government. Retrieved from: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/indigenous-experts-advise-declaration-plan

MFAT, (n.d. a) Understanding CPTPP: Protections. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/understanding-cptpp/protections

MFAT. (n.d. b). The Māori Economy. Trade for All Agenda. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-for-all-agenda/

MFAT. (n.d. c). Trade and Regional Economic Development. Trade for All Agenda. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-for-all-agenda/

MFAT. (2019). New Zealand’s One China Policy (Internal Document). Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affiars and Trade.

Mikaere, A. (2011). Colonising Myths, Māori Realities. Wellington, New Zealand: Huia Publishers.

Murphy, M. (2014). Self-Determination as Collective Capability: The Case of Indigenous Peoples. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 15(4), 320-334.

New Zealand Herald, (2018, Jun 2). The Golden Triangle is stretching south. Retrieved from: https://www.nzherald.co.nz/sponsoredstories/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503708&objectid=12061288

NZIER, (2017). Benefits of Trade: Report for Export New Zealand. Wellington: New Zealand Institute for Economic Research. Retrieved from: https://nzier.org.nz/publication/the-benefits-of-trade

O’Malley, V. and Hutton, (2007). The Nature and Extent of Contact and Adaptation in Northland, c.1769-1840. Report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 1.

Petrie, H. (2002) Colonisation and the Involution of the Maori Economy. A paper for Session 24 XIII World Congress of Economic History. Buenos Aires.

Philpott, A. (2019). The ship is not the only vessel on the river: Revisiting first nations’ mobility rights under Article III of the 1794 Jay Treaty. Appeal, 24, 157.

Public Works Act 1981.

Puig, S. (2019). International Indigenous Economic Law. UC Davis Law Review 52:3, 1243-1316.

Ruakura (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://www.ruakura.co.nz/

Sierra Service Project. (2015). Understanding Reservations: A Basic Study Guide. Retrieved from: http://sierraserviceproject.org/understanding-reservations/

Silver Chain Covenant 1600s.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840.

Te Ture Whenua Act 1993.

Terrell J. (2004). Introduction: ‘Austronesia’ and the great Austronesian migration. World Archaeology, 36(4), 586-590.

The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://hpaied.org/

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 1764.

United States ex rel. Diabo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d 282 at 283 (D. Pa. 1927).

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Waitangi Tribunal. (2014). Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry, Wai 1040.

Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72.

Wong, M.D. & Buba, J. (2017). Special Economic Zones: An operational review of their impacts (English). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Retrieved from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/316931512640011812/Special-economic-zones-an-operational-review-of-their-impacts

Yablon-Zug, M. (2008). Gone But Not Forgotten: The Strange Afterlife of the Jay Treaty’s Indian Free Passage Right. Queen’s L. J. 33, 565.

Post series: Should indigenous economies take the LEAP? (2)

Members of Te Whānau ā-Apanui at Taiwan Indigenous TV preparing for their appearance on Ui 輕鬆講 (June, 2019) –  a demonstration of the power of everyday acts of resurgence #IndigenousConnections

This section builds on Part 1 of this series to provide a theoretical basis for the final instalment (part 3 – to come).

Self-determination: law or resurgence — or both?

International law promotes the principal of equal treatment and self-determination, which includes peoples’ rights to freely pursue their social, cultural and economic development aspirations. This principle is provided in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter), Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Article 3 of the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), all of which underscore the intention of member States to uphold that principle. However, for indigenous self-determination, Article 46 in the UNDRIP imposes a restriction on interpretation of the Declaration. This suggests that in signing up to the UNDRIP member states considered recognition of indigenous self-determination as symbolic matter rather than a commitment to actively pursue, consequently locating colonisation as something in the past rather than accepting or acknowledging its ongoing effects (Corntassel, 2012, p.92).

Notably, New Zealand did not officially sign up to the UNDRIP until  2010 – three years after it was introduced and signed by 144 other member states. Interestingly, China voted in support of the UNDRIP despite not recognising Indigenous Peoples in the territories it proclaims sovereignty over, including Taiwan. However, New Zealand was not alone. Neither Canada nor the U.S. signed the UNDRIP at that time. Unsurprisingly then, New Zealand’s action to date parallels the virtue signalling of other members in its non-implementation of any of the articles. And whilst the New Zealand government announced earlier in 2019, its intention to “develop a plan of action to drive and measure New Zealand’s progress towards the aspirations” of UNDRIP (Mahuta, 2019), it framed the articles as aspirations rather than firm commitments, arguably heightening the presumption of symbolism and creating ambiguity around what the resulting action plan will actually do.

Domestically, many Indigenous Peoples entered treaties during the early contact period to preserve their tribal sovereignty, as settler populations and demands on resources grew. In New Zealand, the key instruments were He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (He Whakaputanga or the Declaration of Independence) and Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te Tiriti), and in North America the Silver Chain Covenant and the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty). However, these treaties and declarations commonly lacked legal standing later in settler courts attracting rulings that would serve to abrogate their rights for generations to come. For example, in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877), the New Zealand Supreme Court declared Te Tiriti a nullity erasing any ability to rely on it against the injustices of the Crown. Similarly, in Francis v the Queen (1956) the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Jay Treaty had no legal effect because it had not been incorporated into domestic legislation. Common across white settler courts was the erosion of Indigenous Peoples rights as settler governments took hold of stolen territories.

Politics of Recognition and International Indigenous Economic Law

As noted in part 1, the question as to whether self-determination of Indigenous Peoples is actionable through international law or law at all, is disputed at length from scholars of both legal and non-legal disciplines. For instance, Jeff Corntassel (2012) rejects the politics of recognition (i.e. legal ot State recognition of indigenous rights) in favour of a “responsibility based ethic grounded in relationships to homelands and community”. He argues this approach avoids the limitations accompanying State recognition (i.e. settler determined findings about Indigenous Peoples) (p.93). Corntassel (2012) insists that Indigenous Peoples do not claim rights, instead they assert responsibilities that are sourced from their relationships with the natural and spiritual worlds and it is through these responsibilities that their rights emerge (p.92). Additionally, Corntassel (2012) considers sustainability an inherent element of indigenous self-determination and that this is achieved through practicing “every day acts of resurgence” (pp.92-93). Ani Mikaere (2011) shares a similar view emphasising that Māori rights as tangata whenua of New Zealand derive from Māori having occupied the lands for generations and “having developed an intimate connection with this environment, and an intricate set of relationships to regulate our place within it” (p.123-146).

So how might we understand indigenous rights to self-determination outside the legal institutions we have become accustomed to?

In the New Zealand context, te kawa o te marae (the protocol of marae) provides a useful example of everyday acts of resurgence with many non-indigenous peoples also understanding and respecting that marae operate according to processes and protocols grounded in a tikanga (values) that governs people’s behaviours and roles on the marae. This is a result of Māori continually practicing their culture, emphasising the importance of cultural maintenance for sustainable indigenous self-determination. It also exemplifies how over time everyday acts can shift mind-sets –  where indigenous rights can be seen as grounded in indigenous relationships to people and place and not as decided in the court room or dictated by the pens of parliament.

In an international trade context, resurgence could be demonstrated through restoring traditional international relations practices too. For instance, the Kaswentha – a treaty agreed between the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (an alliance between the Mohawk, Oneida, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Seneca Nations) in Canada and European settlers during the early 1600s, set out the guiding principles that would govern their relationship amid growing tensions over the fur trade (Philpott, 2019, p.162-63). These principles expressed through the ‘Two-Row Wampum belt’ represented:

…a canoe and a ship travelling down a river side-by-side. The canoe holds the Haudenosaunee peoples, cultures, customs and laws, while the ship houses European settlers and their ways of life. The principles of the Kaswentha provide that the vessels travel together in a spirit of friendship and mutual respect.

(Philpott, 2019, p.162-63)

The Kaswentha illustrates the value traditional customs offer the contemporary international trade framework and the potential to radically shift how nations and peoples engage with each other for economic cooperation. Enabling Indigenous Peoples to introduce these practices as acts of resurgence complements the existing international law framework that is predicated on the promotion of peace and friendly relations between nations (see Art 1, the Charter) while retaining the cultural distinctions of the Indigenous Peoples entering into any negotiations.

Indigenous methods of establishing relationships puts values upfront, bringing the notion of responsibilities to each other and their own values systems to the fore in a humanising and transformative way rather than reducing relationships in trade to mere transactions.

In contrast to Corntassel’s responsibility based ethic that looks away from the law as a source of rights for Indigenous Peoples, Sergio Puig (2019) looks toward international indigenous economic law, as a developing body of work that he considers to operate as a shield and sword for the protection and advancement of indigenous rights, respectively (p.1302-1303). Similar to Corntassel (2012) who differentiates indigenous self-determination (relationships based) from state sovereignty (rights based) (p.92), Puig (2019) distinguishes indigenous rights from human rights, expounding Indigenous Peoples rights as distinctly rooted in unjust political and economic factors resulting from colonisation (p.1245).

Puig’s (2019) way around the over reliance on human rights instruments is to look to international economic treaties (p.1304). For example, he notes how the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides a range of exceptions that permit states to impose restrictions on trade, such as taking any necessary measures to protect public morals which operates as a shield for their protection (Puig, 2019, p.1304) . He references the EC-Seal Products case (EC-Seals cited in Puig, 2019), in which the European Union (EU) relied on the public morals clause under Art XX(a) GATT to defend a claim brought against it by Canada and Norway. The dispute concerned the EU Seal Regime that introduced a ban on the import and export of seal products because it discriminated against other indigenous groups and producers of similar products with an exception clause only for the Inuit Peoples of Greenland, for whom seal hunting remains a tradition. Although the WTO Appellate Body upheld that the exception was discriminatory in part because the EU had not made ‘comparable efforts to facilitate the access of the Canadian Inuit to the IC exception as it did with respect to the Greenlandic Inuit’ it considered the EU Seal Regime was necessary to protect public morals but the chapeau requirements were not met. However, as Puig (2019) highlights, the AB left open the ability of the EU to make the exception WTO compliant (p.1304-1305). Canada’s attempt to protect the rights of its Inuit Peoples in this case, is also worth noting, as it adds to the deepening dialogue emerging from States, providing potential geopolitical levers for Indigenous Peoples to draw on.

While Puig (2019) focuses on international economic treaties as a source for change, his argument could equally extend to specific bilateral or multilateral trade agreements where the changes in mandate occur domestically. For example, the Treaty of Waitangi Exception Clause contained in all New Zealand’s contemporary trade agreements acts as a shield to protect Māori treaty rights (MFAT, n.d. a), whereas Chapter 19 of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation (ANZTEC) acts as a sword to advance indigenous to indigenous economic and cultural exchange. Using Puig’s argument in this way also brings the obligations of settler governments within closer proximity to its Indigenous Peoples. This provides a resonance to Corntassel’s responsibility based ethic by centring the communities affected in the agreements made between States. Therefore, these two theories could act as complementaries rather than be cast as antagonists, to enable direct relationships within and between Indigenous Peoples and foreign states by building on apparatuses such as the ANZTEC Chapter 19.

However, adopting international economic law as a basis for protecting and advancing indigenous rights potentially suffers from similar weaknesses to the human rights law approach. That is, the governance and rules still depend on systems and structures that have perpetuated the injustices of settler governments against Indigenous Peoples. Be that as it may, earlier treaties and agreements such as He Whakaputanga, Te Tiriti and the Jay Treaty present clear explications of indigenous ancestors recognising the value of having their rights to their territories and resources confirmed and notified internationally for the ongoing and sustainable benefit of their uri (descendants).

Despite some clear weaknesses to work through, I still consider that international indigenous economic law could provide an enabling function for achieving indigenous rights. Different courts, tribunals and governments have recognised, protected or interpreted indigenous rights and practices in various ways and to variable degrees. However, the growing body of international indigenous economic law in conjunction with a responsibility based ethic grounded in the everyday acts of resurgence we already see, could benefit from an agglomeration effect of sorts.  That is, the growing level of political interest in indigenous rights and the moral capital it attracts could provide a useful lever for Indigenous Peoples to cash in on the political capital that in recent times Canada and New Zealand governments at least, have electorally banked in their favour. Moreover, unlike human rights laws, international economic law has a more practical effect because often there are financial incentives for settler governments to uphold the commitments it makes in them, as well as political incentives, such as avoidance of reputational harm at both the domestic and international level. After all, a government seen to not uphold its economic obligations would struggle to secure the trade benefits it seeks in future trade agreements and could attract legitimate trade restrictions.

References

Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Cooperation 2013.

Charter of the United Nations 1945.

Corntassel, J. (2012). Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 86-101.

European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (2014, May 22) WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R.

Francis v. The Queen [1956] S.C.R. 618.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947.

He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929).

Le Dressay, A., Lavallee, N., and Reeves, J. (2010). First Nations Trade, Specialization, and Market Institutions: A Historical Survey of First Nation Market Culture” Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International 72. Retrieved from: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/72

Mahuta, N. (2019, Apr 7). Indigenous experts advise on Declaration plan. Press Release. The Official Website of the New Zealand Government. Retrieved from: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/indigenous-experts-advise-declaration-plan

MFAT, (n.d. a) Understanding CPTPP: Protections. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/understanding-cptpp/protections

Mikaere, A. (2011). Colonising Myths, Māori Realities. Wellington, New Zealand: Huia Publishers.

Philpott, A. (2019). The ship is not the only vessel on the river: Revisiting first nations’ mobility rights under Article III of the 1794 Jay Treaty. Appeal, 24, 157.

Puig, S. (2019). International Indigenous Economic Law. UC Davis Law Review 52:3, 1243-1316.

Silver Chain Covenant 1600s.

Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840.

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 1764.

United States ex rel. Diabo v. McCandless, 18 F.2d 282 at 283 (D. Pa. 1927).

Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007.

Waitangi Tribunal. (2014). Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry, Wai 1040.

Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72.

Yablon-Zug, M. (2008). Gone But Not Forgotten: The Strange Afterlife of the Jay Treaty’s Indian Free Passage Right. Queen’s L. J. 33, 565.

Post series: Should indigenous economies take the LEAP? (1)

Austronesian Migration Path: Exhibited at Taoyuan City Indigenous Cultural Centre, Taiwan

[Ellipsister note: aroha mai, I had a meme on here originally but it appears it could be misread or subject to interpretation – and on that basis I removed it]

Recently, I wrote a (relatively) short paper “Should indigenous economies take the LEAP?”. Its purpose was to explore what self-determination could look like in a practical sense. Maybe I’m a bit of an international trade truther or something, but I absolutely believe trade is at the heart of achieving peace and self-determination.

Since I haven’t written here in a while, I figured I would share that paper over three parts: context, theory and application (summarised below), with minor modifications to the original text for easier flow.

Note I explore this topic by way of comparative analysis locating Māori in the Asia Pacific trading picture with their ancestral linkages to Taiwan and their growing connections to North America through forums such as the World Indigenous Business Forum and APEC.

Summary breakdown

Part 1: remembers the past and identifies some of the similarities in pre-contact indigenous trade arrangements to emphasise that international trade and economic development is a traditional activity of Indigenous Peoples.

Part 2: unpacks two theoretical approaches to indigenous self-determination that demonstrates Indigenous Peoples developed their own guiding principles to international trade and that it is possible to restore those practices when construing the theoretical approaches as complementary rather than antagonistic. Here, I compare the different ways Indigenous Peoples entered into agreements to protect their rights – including those to trade, with early settler governments and the legal treatment of those agreements by different courts, tribunals and governments.

Part 3: considers different development models and how they might be used to enhance various indigenous initiatives that are at different stages of development. This part is particularly interested in special jurisdictions known as LEAP (Legal, Economic, Administrative, Political) zones. I suggest that when a LEAP zone is combined with the theoretical approaches to indigenous self-determination, it offers a creative, practical and culturally relevant approach that reflects traditional forms of development adapted to modern contexts.

As one might expect, the most useful place to start then is the beginning.

Introduction

Indigenous economic and trade development existed and prospered before colonisation and continued into the early contact period (Petrie, 2002; Philpott, 2019; Puig, 2019; Bellwood, Hung & lizuka, 2011) and many of these economies are still recovering from the destruction inflicted through colonisation. However, as indigenous economies experience greater resurgence, international trade becomes an increasingly important economic lever to support the sustainable economic development of their tribes. In New Zealand, trade accounts for around 60 per cent of our economic activity and connects businesses to new markets to help them grow their customer base and explore new technologies (MFAT, n.d. c). The tradable sector also provides employment benefits and pays significantly higher than the non-tradable sector across the employment pipeline (NZIER, 2017). As such, trade has both direct and indirect benefits for whānau (family). However, domestic marginalisation of indigenous economies can create barriers for indigenous enterprises to enter international markets (Puig, 2019). I argue that indigenous self-determination could play a critical role in transforming tribal economies (Cornell & Kalt, 2000) and could improve the physical and psychological wellbeing of Indigenous Peoples (Murphy, 2014). To support that proposition we need policy innovation to support Indigenous Peoples to participate in international trade activities by introducing regional initiatives possessing the potential to un-restrict market access to accelerate indigenous economic development opportunities.

Remembering the past

Indigenous Peoples of the Asia Pacific region have their roots in Taiwan (Ko et al., 2014). One of the most widely accepted connections of this common whakapapa (genealogies) is their shared linguistic heritages revealing that Austronesian languages, originating in Taiwan, have the largest geographical spread of any language family in the world (Ko et al., 2014; Terell, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Huang & Liu, 2016). This language migration demonstrates that over many generations (between 5000-6000 years ago), the Austronesian speaking ancestors of Māori made sea voyages across Asia and eventually down into the South Pacific (Ko et al., 2014; Terell, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Bellwood, Fox & Tryon, 2006). During those voyages and explorations, Bellwood et al (2006) describe these Austronesian ancestors as having “fissioned and diversified in complex ways” (p.2) birthing new cultures, shaping traditions and adapting to new environments (Crowley, 2006; Terell, 2004).

When Māori ancestors arrived and settled New Zealand around 800-1000 years ago they carried their economies with them (King, 2003 cited in Te Puni Kōkiri, 2007). During this period, coastal and inland hapū exchanged items of abundance in their localities, for instance, fish from the coast for birds from the forest (O’Malley & Hutton, 2007). Māori also engaged in trade, formed alliances, and established the earliest enterprises in New Zealand (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2007). During the early encounters, Māori were already navigating offshore to trade with the Pacific Islands, Australia, North and South America, Asia and Europe where they were exposed to new technological developments and economic systems (Petrie, 2002, p.2). Before that, their Austronesian ancestors from Taiwan had been trading goods such as jade products by sea from Taiwan into the Philippines (Bellwood et al., 2011, p.31). Similarly, North American First Nations were specialising in fishing and seal fur trade, facilitating intertribal trade and establishing trade routes such as the Oolichan grease trails that later became a primary fur-trade route (Le Dressay Lavallee & Reeves, 2010, p.117). Further South, Native Americans were connected across the U.S. with pipestone artefacts, native to Minnesota, found as distant as Kansas and Ohio (Le Dressay et al., 2010, pp.117-118).

Adding to the vibrant trade picture is evidence of trade between Mayan and Inca civilisations who built and patrolled some of the earliest trade infrastructure (Le Dressay et al., 2010, pp.117-118).

Accordingly, indigenous economies and trade networks were thriving in their own right and Indigenous Peoples were adapting to new technologies through increased encounters with other nations who brought with them new goods and materials (Petrie, 2002; Philpott, 2019; Le Dressay et al, 2010). Speculation that indigenous economies were undeveloped and incapable of innovation is unfounded and belies a history that tells a different story (Petrie, 2002).

Toward theories of self-determination

The question as to whether self-determination of Indigenous Peoples is actionable through international law or law at all, is disputed at length from scholars of both legal and non-legal disciplines. Political posturing, virtual signalling and strict or questionable legal interpretations typically underpin criticisms of the politics of recognition, that is, attempts to locate indigenous self-determination in State recognition of it through international human rights law (Corntassel, 2012, p.92). Those supportive of legal recognition approaches tend to view legal avenues as the most practical way to seek justice and achieve certainty of rights. Whereas opponents typically possess low trust in these institutions considering it a vulgarity to rely on settler developed norms and institutions as the source of Indigenous Peoples rights (Corntassel, 2012). And as courts and tribunals have demonstrated time and again rulings can be overturned, and governments have shown they can also be legislated over (e.g. Puig, 2019; Yablon-Zug, 2008), which can work either in favour of or in opposition to indigenous rights.

Part 2 to follow

References

Bellwood, P., Hung, H-C. & lizuka, Y. (2011) Taiwan Jade in the Philippines: 3,000 Years of Trade and Long-distance Interaction, in Purissima Benitez-Johannot (ed.), Paths of Origins: The Austronesian Heritage in the Collections of the National Museum of the Philippines,the Museum Nasional Indonesia,and the Netherlands Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Singapore: ArtPostAsia. Retrieved from: http://www.earth.sinica.edu.tw/~epma/papers/…/A14%20PathsofOrigins_pp30-41_2011.pdf

Bellwood, P; Fox, J.J & Tryon, D. (2006). The Austronesians in History: Common Origins and Diverse Transformations in Bellwood, P; Fox, J.J & Tryon, D. (eds.) The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. ANU Press. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbjx1.4

Consedine, B. (2007). Historical Influences and the Māori Economy. Wellington: Te Puni Kōkiri.

Corntassel, J. (2012). Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 86-101.

Crowley, T. (2006) Austronesian languages: overview.  Encyclopedia of language & linguistics. Oxford: Elsevier, 600–609.

King, Michael. (2003). The Penguin History of New Zealand. Auckland. Penguin Books Ltd.

Le Dressay, A., Lavallee, N., and Reeves, J. (2010). First Nations Trade, Specialization, and Market Institutions: A Historical Survey of First Nation Market Culture” Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International 72. Retrieved from: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/72

MFAT. (n.d. b). The Māori Economy. Trade for All Agenda. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-for-all-agenda/

MFAT. (n.d. c). Trade and Regional Economic Development. Trade for All Agenda. Wellington: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/trade-for-all-agenda/

Murphy, M. (2014). Self-Determination as Collective Capability: The Case of Indigenous Peoples. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 15(4), 320-334.

NZIER, (2017). Benefits of Trade: Report for Export New Zealand. Wellington: New Zealand Institute for Economic Research. Retrieved from: https://nzier.org.nz/publication/the-benefits-of-trade

O’Malley, V. and Hutton, (2007). The Nature and Extent of Contact and Adaptation in Northland, c.1769-1840. Report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 1.

Petrie, H. (2002) Colonisation and the Involution of the Maori Economy. A paper for Session 24 XIII World Congress of Economic History. Buenos Aires.

Philpott, A. (2019). The ship is not the only vessel on the river: Revisiting first nations’ mobility rights under Article III of the 1794 Jay Treaty. Appeal, 24, 157.

Puig, S. (2019). International Indigenous Economic Law. UC Davis Law Review 52:3, 1243-1316.

Terrell J. (2004). Introduction: ‘Austronesia’ and the great Austronesian migration. World Archaeology, 36(4), 586-590.

Yablon-Zug, M. (2008). Gone But Not Forgotten: The Strange Afterlife of the Jay Treaty’s Indian Free Passage Right. Queen’s L. J. 33, 565.

 

How do we centre Muslim voices?

Friday 15 March 2019. The heart stands still. The lives of 50 people stolen by a terrorist in the most reprehensible of ways. Not a lone wolf. Not a mentally unwell individual. A terrorist armed with weapons of war committed to a white supremacist ideology that demands its followers reach into and express the darkest versions of themselves.

How do we centre Muslim voices in the aftermath of white terrorism?

As I watch across a range social and news media platforms, many of us who identify as Māori are noting our lack of shock or surprise at the racism and the extent of white extremism in this country. Any shock we feel is the abysmal failure of the modern system of government to prevent terror from actually happening on our whenua. Shocked at the depth of institutional racism to the point of weakening our security institutions. We protested surveillance because it unfairly targeted Māori and other communities of colour. We saw the terror that the State imposed on whānau and hapori Māori with Operation 8. However, we passively assumed that our state surveillance meant the system would also have its eyes on the heinous white extremists living here.  But it didn’t and we will hold the government to account for that in the days and weeks to come.

For now, we must tautoko our Muslim brothers and sisters to voice their concerns and experiences. I know that this might raise some challenging feelings for Māori across this motu – being asked to centre non-Māori voices is confronting when we have had centuries of trying to have our own voices centred when it comes to matters of racism affecting our lives. We must acknowledge too, that some of our whānau also identify as Muslim, and we must support them to have their voices heard.

In the aftermath of white terrorism, it is important then for us to understand why it matters to centre Muslim voices, and how we can go about doing that.

Why must we centre Muslim voices?

We must centre Muslim voices to enable change in Aotearoa. To change how our systems privilege different groups over others, to change how dominant groups in society treat people who hold different beliefs, practice different cultural traditions, speak different languages, have different names, wear different clothing, or have different skin colours. We must centre Muslim voices to help change attitudes – because hate and intolerance begins in the home and the places we normalise privilege and tolerate prejudice.

How might we centre Muslim voices?

I came across an article that set out seven ways to support and centre the voices of people of colour. What I have done below, is applied some of those in the context of Māori.

What is our privilege?

We have the privilege of recognition as tangata whenua of New Zealand.

This is not privilege in the sense that we extract excessive social and economic benefits from our status as tangata whenua.

We must recognise that compared to non-Māori people of colour, the dominant white population and the system designed for them at least recognises us as being of the land and not foreign to it.

Understanding our oppression

We are not immune from racism, prejudice and discrimination in our homes. We rightly criticise the treatment of Māori by successive governments and the way society stereotypes and degrades us. However, we are complicit in much stereotyping and prejudicing of other communities of colour and marginalised groups.

An obvious example is the appalling attitude and distasteful behaviour demonstrated by the Destiny Church this week – many of its followers identifying as Māori, the Bishop himself – Māori. The Bishop taking exception to the nation observing 2 minutes of silence followed by the Muslim call to prayer (adhan) to be played across New Zealand’s airwaves in remembrance and honour of the dead and their whānau. Inciting hysteria inside its congregation that this government was threatening Christianity that the Bishop claims this country was founded on.

We must remember that Māori cosmogyny existed prior to contact and remains a fundamental element of our Māori identity. Some forms of Christianity – including the Destiny Church brand are complicit in the kinds of oppression that stoke bigoted hate fires and fuel ideologies like white supremacism leading to extremism.

For those who have come to identify as Christian, this is not a diatribe against Christianity. It’s a reminder to all of us – Christian and non-Christian Māori, that this was a faith brought to our communities from outside Te Ao Māori. It provided a spiritual connection for many Māori communities following colonisation and suppression of our language and culture. However, we cannot allow exclusionary versions of Christianity to permit us to internalise prejudicial practices and views.

On a less religious angle, we cannot allow political parties and the media to taint our views about migrants and refugees or to teach us that people who look different from us – as Māori or White, are not of this land.

Over time – almost 200 years, colonisation of Māori has supported and taught us to internalise racism, prejudice and discrimination in our communities and we must be ready to examine these now. Because if we do not un-learn those things we have internalised, we perpetuate the harm that props up the structures of white supremacy, rather than tearing them down.

Do things differently

We know that our spaces for dialogue are limited. That institutional racism and bias close the door to us at almost every step we take to challenging white supremacy in our social, political and economic domains.

We are not being asked or told to take a seat in our own whenua.

One way to visualise doing things differently is to take ourselves out of Te Ao Pākehā where communities of colour fight for the same piece of the diversity and inclusion pie, and step confidently and firmly in to Te Ao Māori.

Where the kawa that governs how we share our kōrero embeds the notion of aroha ki te tangata – respect for all peoples. Where there is a time for listening and a time for speaking. Our time to talk will return when the speakers have had their say.

Follow our kawa and trust in our tikanga. Give space with only love in our hearts.

Waiho i te toipoto, kaua i te toiroa

Let us keep close together, not far apart

 

*Please note that this is just one among many indigenous views. I don’t speak on behalf of all Māori.

Free speech is peace directed, refuse their act of war

Ignorance is not just not knowing stuff. It is also believing you have nothing more to learn. For instance, you choose to be racist and you can choose to not be racist because you can choose to do the work to unlearn the racist tropes and half histories you have chosen to be your truth. You can choose to share power or store power. You can choose peace or you can choose war. You can choose to understand free speech as something more than a right to say whatever you please without consequence.

Recently, I was asked what my position was on free speech and I was torn. I absolutely do not think any group whose ideology in practice engages in genocide has a ‘right’ to build or advocate that kind of movement under the protection of free speech.  The very real and imminent threat here is the potential of such groups to tap into people’s deepest fears and insecurities, play on their ignorance and mobilise them to commit atrocities that threaten the survival of a group or groups of people.

In saying that, ignorance is why I also consider there to be a place for deplorable worldviews. That is, how can we learn what inclusiveness looks like, if we suppress hatefulness? How do we reach ignorant people and help them to un-learn and re-learn if they don’t know what their ignorance looks like in contrast to inclusiveness? What if inclusiveness today creates unintended consequences that lead to different kinds of ignorance in future? We already hear discussions around transculturation, that is, the merging and converging of cultures into one homogenous group. There is a very real risk that inclusiveness passively morphs into its own white supremacy over time and how do we counter that if people cannot see that the white supremacy they have bought into is not inclusiveness?

I know I have more questions than solutions. But I think its important to start questioning things like inclusiveness and how we see that operating in future – what protections do we have to ensure it’s not a dangerously quiet transition into becoming the dominant culture?

As I see it, free speech is both theoretical and action oriented. Over time, societies frame and reframe it according to social norms, political beliefs and cultural practices. Many proponents of free speech often refer to western legal rights to justify hateful and challenging positions and liberal responses in turn use that same legal framework to justify limitations or restrictions on what we should allow or not allow people to say. In other words, we tend to fixate on the procedural elements (e.g. who, when, what and where) and legislative interpretation (e.g. rights, defences, exemptions) and subsequently lock ourselves in to a perpetual cycle of disharmony. But what if we turned our attention to its action oriented limb to understand the act of speaking freely, the act of actively listening, and the act of restoring harmony where ignorance and enlightenment clash?

In my view, neither of the arguments referred to above speak meaningfully to the mana and the mauri of people or peoples. One obvious reason is that the debate centres in western discourse. Arguably, the ‘public interest’ and the ‘autonomy of the individual’ arguments do embody elements of those concepts. For instance, autonomy respects the individual and therefore the mana they hold within themselves, and public interest speaks to the mauri of the people or peoples and protecting their wellbeing. However, because these are dealt with separately as opposing arguments, rather than as part of a whole story neither argument fully addresses – nor can it, ‘why and how’ free speech can operate harmoniously in our modern social context.

I think tikanga and kawa could and should have a major role in the free speech discussion in context of Aotearoa New Zealand because kaupapa Māori models provide a unique and balancing lens. These models help us to think about the issue differently and in a deeper and more spiritual context.

I’ve been delving into the stories of my tīpuna and their actions and corresponding kōrero in an effort to assert their rangatiratanga and to retain mana motuhake for their hapū and for Māori collectively.  Our tīpuna spoke freely, they spoke fiercely and by liberal standards today at times they spoke arrogantly, aggressively and derogatorily about the imminent settler government that threatened the survival of our people and our culture.

But lets clear something up here first, the threat to our survival as a peoples by the coloniser was and is not the same as the disingenuously propagated threat by white supremacists fearful of the erasure of their white-ness. Firstly, colonisation was the action-oriented part of a much larger political ideology that swept the globe, western imperialism. It was an act of white supremacy. Secondly, political power resides in white institutions through the militarisation of western nation states. The Molyneux’s and Southern’s of this world are using a pre-emptive war tactic appealing to the protections of free speech in an effort to hold onto white institutional power through the extermination of any peoples who they perceive as threat to that power storing. So when I think about speaking freely, and what it is intended to achieve through a tikanga lens, I am directed toward a state of peace and harmonious relations.

I think about the Māori context and how we deal with a take (issue) and the way the rākau is passed around so every person is allocated time to have their say, no matter how hard that truth may be to hear. The context within which these discussions or confrontations take place is one where the group affirm the mana of each speaker, and preserve the mauri of the people through a process of restoration – removing the tapu through noa. I love that our ancestors adopted a healing process so we could return to our lives with aroha in our hearts to continue the mahi of manaakitanga. This is the process by which they kept the mana of all intact and restored the mauri of all involved so the tribe could thrive as a collective. I don’t here claim that peace was achieved following every confrontation, we know that is simply not the case – in some cases, confrontations led to war (I’ll come back to this ‘war’ point below). If we can uphold the legacy of all our ancestors (Māori and non-Māori alike) in preserving our right to speak freely where our intention is directed toward peace and harmonious relations, then we can be clear about our expectations of each other and the process for managing conflicts, and helping heal ignorance.

This brings me back to current issues and my point of view on free speech:

Promoting and enabling movements and actions that threaten the survival of peoples, is not an act of free speech, it is an act of war because actions not seeking harmony and balance of power, threaten the survival of peoples.

When Mayor Phil Goff refused to provide a platform for fascism, he was refusing their act of war. When the Owners of the Powerstation revoked use of its venue for fascist purposes, it refused their act of war. When the people turned up at Aotea Square to challenge the arrival of fascists on our shores, they too refused their act of war. Similarly, when our ancestors signed He Whakaputanga and Te Tiriti o Waitangi they refused the settler governments act of war. And as I see it, locking hapū and iwi out of Parliament, is an act of war.

The Aboriginal Peoples’ Call for Global Action: #SOSBLAKAUSTRALIA

 

 

Whose land are you standing on?

 

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples of Australia have subsidised the lifestyle choices of white Australia since the colonisers arrived and stole their land, stole their resources, stole their children, forced communities into slavery, and denied their human, economic and cultural rights at every step. Benjamin Warlngundu Ellis Bayliss itemises out the costs of colonisation:

…frontier wars; loss of land; loss of culture; loss of wages; loss of languages; loss of songs; loss of identity; genocide; massacres; rape; destruction of sacred sites & land; stolen generations; Maralinga nuclear testing; stolen artefacts and the collection of ancestors remains; oppression; fear & intimidation; no treaties; influenza; poor health; life expectancy; no self-determination; no consultation; disease; exploitation; creating a culture of dependency; famine; introduction of foreign flora & fauna; culture of divide & conquer; discrimination; racism; meddling with the theory of eugenics; attempts to breed our mob out; so called dying softly in the pillow; deaths in custody; incarceration rates; denigration; invisibility & lack of positive representations; attempts of assimilation; policies of control & management, including driving people from their lands; intellectual property theft; meddling with the Racial Discrimination Act; NT Intervention; lateral violence; and trivialising our interests, concerns; upon many, many others I am sure I have missed.

The Abbott government’s recent announcement that around 150 Aboriginal communities would be forcibly closed in Western Australia, prompted a global call to action for our indigenous whanaunga. This decision was made without consultation and without the consent of Australia’s Aboriginal Peoples.

Pause.

We would not accept this in Aotearoa New Zealand. So why on earth are we so silent when it comes to the tyranny of the Australian government?

 

SOS Blak OZ

 

On Blackfulla Revolution’s Facebook is a call to those who have ignored and continue to ignore the oppression and injustice suffered by Australia’s First Nations Peoples.

 [7min 35s]

But this isn’t constrained to Australia. Abroad, descendant’s of settler generations ignore the impact colonisation has had on Indigenous Peoples within the lands they colonised. It is why Indigenous Peoples everywhere are reaching out to their whanaunga across borders  to achieve kotahitanga and bring our Peoples together in solidarity. This is not separatism. This is not an attempt to turn the tepu and oppress non-indigenous people. It is an effort to get the sleepy masses to recognise that: Indigenous Lives Matter.

This policy being pursued by Tony Abbot & his government is the continuance of that dark history of colonisation in Australia. This system imposed on Australia’s First Peoples is designed to disadvantage their communities at every social, cultural and economic opportunity. This policy is nothing less than forced urbanisation and assimilation. It is an explicit attempt to strip these communities of their connection to their traditional lands.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, many Māori have taken up the plight to stand with our First Nations whanaunga in Australia. MP Marama Fox, Māori Party, sought to table a motion that the House of Representatives condemn the the forced closure of these Aboriginal Communities and to call on the Australian government to honour its commitments to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Although tabling the motion was blocked by government Minister Gerry Brownlee, National Party, it has since been tabled and will be voted on in 3 weeks when Parliament resumes.

The kumara vine indicates that the Māori Party, Greens, Labour, United Future and ACT will all support the motion. However, NZ First and National have signaled that they are against it.

As most will know, recently the National Party lost a seat in Northland, to NZ First’s Winston Peters. The compositon of the house has changed slightly such that National now only have 59 seats. In order for the motion to pass, NZ First support is required.

Winston Peter’s spent much of his campaign talking about how successive governments have ignored the issues that matter to the Northland electorate – jobs, poverty, health and so on. In opposing Marama Fox’s motion, Peter’s words would  ring incredibly hollow given the broader context of his concerns – that governments ought not neglect small communities, and instead ought to manaaki their aspirations. If he stands by his commitment to Northland, then I see no reason why he and his party would not support the call to recognise the rights of Aboriginal Peoples in their communities that have been neglected by the Australian government,  who now deem it appropriate to forcibly close those communities without consultation or consent of the peoples. So I urge people to lobby NZ First to offer their support to add international weight to the plight of the Aboriginal Peoples.

So far three events in Aotearoa New Zealand have been organised around the country to coincide with the global action to support our Aboriginal whanaunga.

For further details see:

Tamaki-Makaurau (Auckland), 1 May 2015, 18:00, QE II Square (next to Britomart)

Hamilton, 1 May 2015, 13:00, The Pulse (27b Whatawhata Road, Dinsdale).

Wellington, 1 May 2015, 18:00, Location tbc.

So it’d be cool if everyone could, you know, be present and support the campaign to STOP! The Forced Closure of Aboriginal Communities. Our silence is complicity. Make their voices heard and show your solidarity with all First Nations Peoples of Australia.

Food Security apparently optional for the Children of Aotearoa

Last night the government (National and ACT) voted down two bills that sought to provide food to children particularly in low decile schools. That is, children who live in the most economically deprived areas of the country. The bills essentially dealt with the issue of food security, or alternatively stated, food insecurity.[1]

Food security is considered as existing ‘when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life’.[2] It involves four essential elements: availability, access, stability and utilisation.[3] According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, availability is measured in terms of the quantity, quality and diversity of food available to consumers, while access is measured by both physical and economic access to food.[4] Access and availability are largely guaranteed through national level policy although there is no requirement for a country to ‘achieve food production self-sufficiency’.[5] Importantly, measuring the extent of food security at the national level (that is, that a country has sufficient levels of food to distribute to meet domestic demand) does not necessarily reflect the extent of security at the household or individual levels. A nation can be food secure at the national level while still food insecure at the individual level due to ‘unequal distribution of food within the country’ which may result from food prices and the issue of affordability.[6] Stability is measured through exposure to food security risk, as well as incidences of shocks such as price spikes, fluctuations in domestic food supply and political instability,[7] while utilisation measures the ‘variables that determine the ability to utilise food’ together with ‘outcomes of poor food utilisation’.[8]

Food insecurity has often been considered an issue of  inadequate food supply at the national level. But this is not the case in New Zealand, nor in most developed countries. Instead, it is often the lack of purchasing power on behalf of households.[9] In his entitlements theory, Amartya Sen emphasised similar issues of consumption, demand and access to food by vulnerable people.[10] Sen argued that a person will starve if their entitlement set is absent ‘any commodity bundle with enough food’.[11] Also, that starvation was imminent if there were a change in their factor endowment, such as, loss of land or labour power, or their exchange entitlement mapping, such as food price spikes or loss of employment.[12] He maintained that these changes would restrict a persons ability to acquire any commodity bundle with enough food.[13]

A problem that arises in respect of the Feed the Kids bill, is that critics imply the problem of food insecurity in New Zealand is not one of a chronic nature (as is often found in developing or least developed regions). Therefore, studies that suggest marginal improvements (and perhaps arguments such as Sen’s) which were largely responding to food insecurity in developing countries should not be used to defend policies that attempt to address transitory food insecurity in children in New Zealand through school lunch or breakfast programmes. The reason being that there is little evidence to show that outcomes will provide any significant benefit for the cost of such policies.  For instance, Dr Eric Crampton writes:[15]

[I]t’s hard to make a case for that we’d get any great benefit from the [school breakfast] programmes. Rather, we often find that they don’t even increase the odds that kids eat breakfast at all.

And:

To the extent that they improve outcomes in some studies, we really can’t tell:

whether the effect is from changing the timing of breakfast, in which case we should instead have a morning tea break;

whether the effect is any better than just giving those families an equivalent cash transfer.

However, the cash transfer option doesn’t ensure that children will become food secure. By that I mean it doesn’t ensure that there will be food available or that they will have access to food.  I appreciate that a cash transfer gives the parent more freedom to choose the kinds of food that the child has available to them. However, a cash transfer may also incentivise food producers to increase the price of their foods to exact a benefit for themselves through the increased purchasing power made available at the household level. This could in effect neutralise any benefit that might have otherwise accrued to food insecure households due to affordability issues. Arguably, this problem could be overcome by adjusting for any inflationary effects. But that pattern is hardly desirable and contributes to the cost of government administration. Additionally, a cash transfer may not increase what the parent spends on food at all. Parents who find themselves without work, paying rent and utilities, school costs, and servicing other debts incurred while employed or those parents that simply don’t have enough money to cover the basic bills each month may not be able to increase their food spend, it may mean they’re able to cover costs that they had been unable to cover – car licensing, dentist, school costs, sports fees etc.

However, there are also issues for advocates of the Feed the Kids bill, such as, who supplies the food to the school? Can a government get value for money if entering into a supply agreement with a corporate (who would likely create terms more favourable to itself), or is contracting with a charity necessarily the best option since they may for example, source food products from corporations? There just seems to be a contradiction in fighting capitalism from the left – who are the main advocates of this bill, to partnering with corporations either directly or indirectly.

In principle, I support the Feed the Kids bill. But like many others have suggested, it needs some work. That would have been the benefit of getting it to the Select Committee where the public could make submissions and where robust research was carried out to attempt to construct an effective policy.

An area where I’d like to see research directed, is where food is targeted at the source. That is, where the government invest in local food production. It might be that there is room to incentivise food producers to produce surpluses that are supplied to their local schools. Sure, this is an un-worked idea but we shouldn’t just limit our imagination to cash transfers or supply by food corporations. There is a human right to food and in my mind that means it is a resource first. If the government can improve local food production by investing more in the sector to deal with issues of household and individual food insecurity then perhaps we can tackle a number of issues (such as employment, health, education) while also ensuring children are not subjected to food insecurity whether it be chronic or transitory.

The right to adequate food is recognised and protected in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).[16] The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food defines this right as:[17]

…the right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensure a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear…

The government also has obligations to meet food security goals as set out in the Millennium Development Declaration[18] and the Rome Declaration on World Food Security. [19] I haven’t even touched on issues of undernourishment, nutrition, food sovereignty, the role of agribusiness, deforestation, land grabs, climate issues, infrastructure issues, armed conflict, GMO’s. The topic of food security is vast, and is a priority at the international level. Pity the New Zealand government see it as optional. Perhaps, the next development in the feed the kids campaign, then might be to focus on the wider issue of food security at the household and individual level and find ways to address it that aren’t merely palliative, but involve addressing the network of challenges that cause food insecurity.

 

[1]  Some of the content of this post comprises parts of a dissertation I wrote for my LLM.

[2]  Rome Declaration on World Food Security.

[3]  FAO State of Food Insecurity in the World (2014), at 13.

[4]  Ibid

[5]  Christopher Stevens, Romilly Greenhill, Jane Kennan and Stephen Devereux “The WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Food Security” (paper prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat, Economic Series No. 42, London, 2000), at 3.

[6]  At 2-3.

[7]  Ibid.

[8]  Ibid.

[9]  World Bank Poverty and Hunger (1986)

[10]  FAO “Chapter 2. Food security: concepts and measurement” in Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualising the Linkages (FAO, Rome, 2003), at 28.

[11]  Amartya Sen Food, Economics and Entitlements (World Institute for Developmental Economics Research, United Nations University, 1986) at 8-9. For Sen, an entitlement is ‘the set of different alternative commodity bundles that the person can acquire through the use of the various legal channels of acquirement open to someone in [their] position’.

[12]  Ibid.

[13]  Ibid.

[14]  Stevens et al, at 5.

[15]   Eric Crampton “Breakfast” Offsetting Behaviour (15 May 2013)

[16]  Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217 A, III (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res2200A XXI 993 UNTS 3 (1966).

[17]  “The Human Right to Food” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

[18] Millennium Development Declaration

[19]  Rome Declaration on World Food Security

Chasing The Illusory Peace

 

Thirty Years War [Source: Google images]

Throughout history, the end of wars has required negotiations between the warring parties.  The most prominent negotiation being the Westphalian Peace Settlement that ended the Thirty Years War [1618-1648] that had desolated Europe. The settlement comprised three treaties which are considered by many jurists to have birthed the international legal system.[1] Confronting a state of perpetual war, the parties to Westphalia negotiated the conditions in which they could agree to cease their hostilities and enter peaceful relations.

The contemporary importance of Westphalia is that it established two fundamental principles that are now codified in the Charter of the United Nations: sovereign equality and territorial integrity.[2] As most can probably surmise, these principles were intended to have anti-hegemonic effect. However, in reality they enabled superpowers to emerge as a result of ‘radical inequalities among states in size, wealth, and power in international role’.[3] This is evidenced in the composition of the UN Security Council, exemplified by the five permanent States that hold veto power that they can and do use for their own political ends.

Admittedly, although negotiations have ended past wars, the Iraq (and similarly Syria) war is more complex. Firstly, IS is not a State in any formal sense despite their assertion to the contrary. Secondly, it is a civil war not a war where one sovereign State agresses against another equally sovereign State threatening their territorial integrity. It is in this context, that the do not negotiate with terrorists (DNNWT) rule arises.

Whether the DNNWT rule has acquired customary status, I am unsure, but a good case could probably be made given it’s widespread acceptance among States and the clear evidence of State practice. Additionally, it would be consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties principle that a treaty must be concluded between States in order to achieve international legal standing.[4] As terrorist designated organisations are not States, then no internationally binding treaty with IS could ever be legitimately concluded, unless they were to be recognised as a State (which would bring with it a very complex and contentious set of considerations). However, there is always the possibility of a domestic treaty negotiation situation.

However, the DNNWT rule serves both the anti-hegemonic and hegemonic agendas. For the reason that, it protects the sovereign equality of States, but it also allows superpowers to heavily influence the direction of international security policy and to dictate who are legitimate resistance groups according to their own political and economic interests. This might seem reasonable when limiting the scope of discussion to IS given the heinous atrocities that form the basis of their resistance strategy. But the implications extend further than those groups. It is not difficult to conceive of a circumstance when internal resistance might be necessary, such as, when a society is ruled under a violent dictatorship. For instance, many (contentiously) see the resistance of the Free Syrian Army as a justifiable belligerent act against their autocratic government and some States were prepared to support the FSA despite their lack of legal standing at international law.

The logic of the DNNWT rule seems perfectly reasonable.  In order to protect the political sovereignty of a nation, the obvious strategy is to refuse to allow a belligerent militia to influence the decision making of that State.  Of course, there are times where that logic is stretched beyond what is reasonable. Recalling Prime Minister John Key’s assertion that not going to war with IS was essentially allowing them to interfere with New Zealand’s political sovereignty. Absurdity abounding on the very fact that his decision to deploy troops to Iraq comes off the back of pressure from other nations that New Zealand cannot simply be a passive ally. Moreover, that doing nothing or doing what the government have decided to do are both decisions based on the influence of IS.

On the other hand, ruling out negotiations, as mentioned above, removes the very process by which conflict could ever hope to be resolved with enduring peace. I’m not so naive as to think that negotiating with IS would immediately resolve the long history of religious tension within Iraq and its surrounding regions. Nor am I suggesting that IS would even be willing participants  to negotiate a resolution. However,  eliminating the option arguably casts us back almost 400 years to once again face the reality of a perpetual war. Sheldon Richman also alludes to the perpetuity of war arguing that when governments invade and occupy other countries, or ‘underwrite other governments invasions or oppression, the people in the victimised societies become angry enough to want and even to exact revenge’.[5] I’m certainly not convinced that raining hell fire over Iraq and areas controlled by IS will bring about any solution at all.

Similarly, Dr Jeremy Moses (Senior Lecturer, UCNZ) tweeted:[6]

“…there are no good outcomes from [the] Iraq situation. [The] [r]ole of NZ can be nothing more than a favour to the US…NZ will have no material impact on what will be a long, brutal battle for Mosul. And even if IS falls, what then? No-one knows”

And before someone calls me an IS apologist, this is not about defending IS at all. To make that claim is both lazy and unintelligent. As humans in common, we all have an interest in avoiding the spread of hate and unnecessary death. We all have an interest in avoiding a world in which fear is normalised and the quality of our lives debilitated. We cannot pontificate under the pretence of ‘the others’ intolerance when our governments commit or support other governments that commit equally heinous crimes.

Richard Jackson makes the point much better:[7]

…what counts as cruelty and barbarism in war is shaped by our cultural values and historical context. Objectively, it is perverse to insist that burning a man to death with petrol is a greater moral evil than using munitions like phosphorous bombs in military operations which we know will burn a great many innocent people to death, including children. It is the nature of every society however, to point out the cruelty of the enemy while obscuring the cruelty of one’s own actions.

John Key has insisted that the New Zealand must join the club and choose the ‘right side’.He has made the executive decision that New Zealand will deploy troops to Iraq. That does not mean Aotearoa supports him in his crusade. Contrary to the PM’s suggestion that New Zealand’s contributions must exist on some kind of binary – sending troops versus doing nothin,  we can meaningfully contribute to improve the lives and outcomes of Iraqi’s through genuine humanitarian aid while finding a way to open dialogue between IS and the Iraqi government. For instance, New Zealand could consider relaxing our refugee quota, sending food and water, medical supplies and unarmed medical personnel rather than exporting guns, bombs, drones and people armed with what is ultimately a violent mission.

Expanding the war in Iraq will surely aggravate the incapacitating conditions that Iraqi peoples already endure. That is not help, that is hindrance. It is insane that our governments (NZ and abroad) support the export of violence to an area already riddled with instability and fear under the illusion that foreign arms will introduce peace amid the chaos. It’d be good if foreign policy wonks realised that peace is not something you can just bomb into existence.

 

 

 

[1] The Peace of Westphalia comprises three treaties, namely, the Peace of Münster, the Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück see Anuschka Tischer “Peace of Westphalia (1648)” in Oxford Bibliographies online < http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0073.xml>.

[2] Charter of the United Nations, arts 2(1) and 2(4).

[3] Richard Falk “Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia” (2002) 6(4) The Journal of Ethics 311 at 314-317

[4] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 2(1).

[5] Sheldon Richman “Domestic Fear Is the Price of Empire” Free Association: Proudly Delegitimizing the State since 2005 (25 February 2015) < http://sheldonfreeassociation.blogspot.co.nz/2015/02/domestic-fear-is-price-of-empire.html&gt;.

[6] @jeremy_moses <https://twitter.com/jeremy_moses/status/570669388245962752&gt;.

[7] Richard Jackson “IS and the Barbarism of War” RICHARDJACKSONTERRORISMBLOG (12 February 2015). < https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2015/02/12/is-and-the-barbarism-of-war/&gt;.

Disunity as the year comes to an end for the Māori Party?

Te Karere reports that Tariana Turia is furious over Te Ururoa Flavell’s Whānau Ora housing decision:

“The newly-appointed Minister for Whānau Ora has come under attack from the person who setup Whānau Ora and the party he currently leads. Tariana Turia is angry that the co-leader of the Māori Party Te Ururoa Flavell has overturned a decision she made in July to give millions of dollars for social housing to Māori. Te Karere understands the money, intended to be managed by Māori, will now be administered by a government agency.”

Of note, the headline is a little misleading since the decision was not advanced by Flavell and after watching the interview, Turia seems disappointed more than she is furious.

The issue: Flavell has supported Housing Minister Nick Smith in abandoning the previous Māori housing policy which would have seen Te Pou Matakana (an independent Māori organisation) administer $25 million to coordinate Māori housing.

The decision: to transfer this responsibility of Māori Housing to Crown entity Te Puni Kokiri.

As the architect of the previous policy, it is unsurprising that this move has upset Turia. Mainly because it seems to contradict the objectives of Whānau Ora to create rangatiratanga for Māori as opposed to micromanagement by the State. And after scrolling through the feedback on this decision, Turia’s criticism appears to resonate with a sizeable proportion of Māori Party supporters and Māori more generally, including myself.

To be clear, I have much respect for Te Ururoa Flavell. This post is not about trampling on his mana. And I suspect that was not Turia’s intention either. Rather, it is acknowledging that as a Minister of the Crown, his decisions will be scrutinised even by his wider support networks, and that critique is a healthy part of the democratic process. One thing to be mindful of is that Flavell is bound by collective responsibility in his portfolios and must represent the government’s position in relation to his ministerial responsibilities.  This was made clear when the Party members and supporters voted in favour of the relationship accord. It is the primary reason the membership supported Co-Leader Marama Fox as an independent voice in Parliament. That outside cabinet position is intended to give Māori a voice and provide an avenue for criticism of decisions that Māori believe are not in our best interests and do not  steer us toward tino rangatiratanga.

Why the abandonment of Māori governance in favour of State management of Māori housing? Money.  According to Turia:

[If] they were worried about the amount of money, which is what they told me, worried about the amount of money for administration, they could have put that in the contract.

The reason supplied to Turia is a major cause for concern. It explicitly says that the Crown do not trust Māori to manage our affairs. In my view, it is both a condescending and oppressive attitude that intensifies ingrained views of Māori as ‘needing to be civilised’. Moreover, it imposes a view of Māori criminality (i.e. Māori organisations cannot be trusted to act legally or appropriately with significant sums of money) and is further evidence that the heavy chains of colonisation are still firmly in place.  There are, of course, clear instances of the mismanagement of funds within Māori organisations. However, this is not unique to Māori and flagging it as a reason for ‘State’ retention of control entrenches the perception that the behaviour of the few is reflective of the entire Māori population.

The government talks about its role  in creating an enabling environment for Māori. This is language drawn from international trade policy, in particular, the WTO. Unfortunately, the way it is being employed in NZ is eerily similar to the way the developed countries advocate the enabling of developing and least-developed countries but in reality have sidestepped their obligations.

 In response to Turia’s criticism, Māori Party President, Naida Glavish made the following comments as reported on Twitter by Te Kaea Journalist Maiki Sherman:

@MaikiSherman  writes:

Māori Party president Naida Glavish tells former co-leader Tariana Turia to “let go” following her public criticism of Te Ururoa Flavell.

“We would all hate to see Whaea Tariana detract from her own mana and spoil her distinguished record of service to our people and our party”

“It was her own decision to leave Parliament, which necessarily meant passing over the reins to her successors” – Naida Glavish.

Tariana Turia criticised a decision to change administration of funding for Maori social housing to Te Puni Kokiri.

Naida Glavish says the decision was made by Nick Smith, based on a Cabinet decision, on recommendation by the Auditor General.

Apart from the Māori Party’s embarrassing public spat, this also shows they’ve been railroaded by Cabinet. #RelationshipAccord

In my view, Turia’s criticism was not overstepping the boundary – it was a legitimate concern. As a founder of the Party and a key architect of Whānau Ora, it is understandable that she would express her views about its future in light of the decision made. The question asked of her: ‘What message do you have for Te Ururora Flavell?’ was provocative and seems to have baited the Party into a public war of words. Inadvertently implying a disunity that does not, in fact, exist.  The Party will need to mindful of how easy but also harmful it is to conflate legitimate criticism with personal attacks going into 2015 and beyond.

Addendum:

Link to Māori Party Press Release here re: Maiki Shermans commentary on Twitter.